archive also comes with some difficulties. This proposal is not only a methodological appeal which "calls for caution," (van der Laan 2010, 210) but it also invites an important theoretical challenge from post-colonial philosophy. For as Gayatri Spivak has argued, attributing a certain subject position and intentionality to unrepresented individuals, tends to reproduce the very colonial configuration a historian aims to criticize, because "letting the subaltern speak for themselves" the historian's text is an effective way of hiding the subjectivity and political intentions of the representing power. (Spivak 1988) The second historiographical issue, namely how to accommodate the frequent assertions of God's intervention in history, has been discussed most extensively by the Pentecostal historian William Kay, who argued for a providential approach. In an earlier pursuit of the problem, Kay contended that "any historical account must be recognisable by its original participants," because otherwise "we assume that the interpretation of primary sources [...] may legitimately be alien to the providers of the primary source." (Kay 1992, 59 ) However, this seems to be too much to ask of the historical ethos, since historians must retain the ability to criticize ideology and thereby to differ from their primary sources. More recently Kay has offered an interesting philosophical approach to the possibility of providential historiography by drawing on Karl Popper's theory of science. (See Kay 2010) On the one hand, Kay utilized Popper's rejection of historicism for criticizing historical approaches to Pentecostalism that rely on functionalist explanations, cultural categories, or the identification of "historical roots," since they are all organized by larger theoretical frameworks: either a certain function, a "broad and slippery concept" of culture, or the identification of the phenomenon of Pentecostalism. 1 On the other hand, Kay saw a certain convergence of providential historical accounts with Popper's rejection of inductive reasoning and his affirmation of the necessary perspectivity of history. However, while the rejection of functionalism, culturalism, or essentialism may easily be based on Popper, it may be doubtful whether he would have liked to see them replaced, of all, by a providential history. Popper saw the natural sciences "as one of the greatest spiritual adventures that man has yet known," (Popper 2002, 50) he refuted a foundational distinction between the laws of physics and history, 2 and he rejected any notion of historical 1 The mentioned types of Pentecostal historiography are based on an article by the Pentecostal historian Augustus Cerillo (1997) . Cerillo basically argued that all four approaches (including the providential approach) have their strengths and weaknesses and therefore " [t] aken together they promise a way toward a more comprehensive and historically satisfying synthesis of the story of the emergence of the American Pentecostal religious tradition." (Cerillo Jr. 1997, 52 ) 2 See esp. Popper (2002, 96-132) While Popper argued against the existence of historical laws that could explain the regularity or historical necessity of certain events, he upheld that the causality of a single event could be described by natural science. Providential historiography, however, tends to offer causalities for single events that transcend the realm of physical description.
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Theorizing Pentecostal Historiography foresight. 3 Moreover, he probably would not have been a friend of Pentecostal providentialism, given his awkward fictional hypothesis, that one day scientific progress may be stopped by an "epidemic of mysticism." (Popper 2002, 145) More importantly, providential histories do not simply argue for the epistemological possibility that God caused the Pentecostal revival, but they usually come with an eschatological outlook and a theological narrative of why and how God works in certain situations. However, both of these features are uncomfortably analogous to Popper's definition of historicism, namely, having a principal aim of historical prediction and attaining the same by "discovering the 'rhythms' or the 'patterns', the 'laws' or the 'trends' that underlie the evolution of history." (Popper 2002, 3) interests driving a certain aspect of the story. The challenge therefore lies in how to understand and accommodate the many sources and their differences in a history of the movement, without reducing the narrative abundance to a skeleton of facts. Instead histories should preserve the political thrust of informants as part of a historical analysis which goes beyond merely reproducing the plurality of encountered assertions.
The following theoretical considerations about such a history will be exemplified using a specific document that is related to the oppression of Pentecostals during the Haile Selassie years. In 1971, the Imperial government's Chief Officer of Public Security sent a circular letter addressed to the mayor of Addis Ababa, the 14 provinces of Ethiopia, the Ministry of Education, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, and the police headquarters.
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He reminded the executive authorities that
Pentecostal meetings had been forbidden in 1967 and insisted that all Pentecostal meeting places must be shut down, and that anyone operating outside of this order should be brought before the law. Much of the letter is based on slanderous gossip and stereotypes about Pentecostals: they engage in sexual orgies with young boys and girls who are failing in school, they stage fraudulent miracles, they disrespect the national flag and they show their disregard for Ethiopian traditions, since they "let their hair grow, which is against the culture, wear tight pants, and stand in groups in the public places in people's way, insulting the elderly people, which is totally outside cultural custom."
Narrativity: Framing the Story of Persecution
When comparing how this letter is used in different accounts, enormous differences appear. The Haustein 2011a, 139-142) The above-mentioned letter was centrally featured in Engelsviken's account. He quoted it in full, devoted some time to discussing its "absurdity" and "obvious inconsistencies", and finally noted that "maybe the most disgusting aspect of the whole letter was the official seal of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church." 8 Engelsviken concluded that the letter resembles in its groundless accusation of immorality and political and religious corruption the suspicions among the pagan people in the Roman Empire in the early days of Christendom. Now as then these rumours were used as a pretext for persecution.
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Overall it can be said that Engelsviken set up a strong narrative of systemic persecution, for which the letter was an important supporting document. It was connected to the two institutions
Engelsviken saw behind the pressure on Pentecostals, the Imperial court and the Orthodox church.
Moreover, the obvious absurdities the letter contained delegitimized the political rationale of both actors and underscored the observation of systemic injustice.
Quite a different persecution account was provided by the EFGBC itself in a jubilee magazine of
(Full Gospel Believers' Church 1978)
The historical sketch provided here mentioned many of the sufferings the church was subjected to, but always asserted that everything was directed or allowed by God for the growth of his church. Even the failed registration bid was presented in such a manner: having accompanied their application with prayers and supplications, the Pentecostals at first were disappointed with God when their registration was denied, but later realized that God utilized the closure of the church for further growth. (Cf. Haustein 2011a, 143-145) Accordingly, the letter by the Officer of Public Security was only mentioned briefly alongside some of the rumours contained in it. However, unlike Engelsviken who used the letter to identify the church's enemies, the EFGBC magazine simply concluded that it was impossible to find out the real political actors behind the gossip and threats. Instead, it was important to remember, that all ministry was established by Ethiopians for the glory of God. (Full Gospel Believers' Church 1978, 17) A third type of persecution narrative can be found in contemporaneous missionary correspondence, He often signalled that the success of the mission depended on its good contacts with the government, and 8 Regarding this seal and the overall role of the Orthodox church in the persecution of Pentecostals, cf. Haustein (2011a, 151-160) . 9 Ibid., p. 149. 10 For the relationship between Swedish missionaries and the Full Gospel Believers' Church, see Haustein (2011a, 132-136 Liberalism. Based on this structure, he asserted that any historian has to develop an explanatory strategy of selecting and combining the different modes of emplotment, argument, and ideological implication, in a "poetic act which precedes the formal analysis of the field" and in which "the historian both creates his object of analysis and predetermines the conceptual strategies he will use to explain it." (White 1973, 31) White's clearly structuralist scheme of interpreting 19th century historians may not be directly applicable to the study of Pentecostal history, but his mode of analysis -to study historical sources as literary works by querying their plots, arguments and ideological implications -is useful for mapping out the differences encountered in the sources. Engelsviken created an antagonistic narrative plot: an unjust political regime inflicted persecution on the Pentecostals, who in turn insisted on their fundamental human right of assembly. The argument is that the regime's actions against the Pentecostals were wholly illegitimate and that its actions were of malicious intent. Since Christians and even the missions, so the ideological implication was that Pentecostals must respect and work with their governments as much as possible.
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The point of these deliberations is not to decide which presentation of the events is more real or accurate, but to show how narratives create the reality of history, i.e. as an antagonistic struggle between freedom and oppression, as God's sovereign hand, or as a political system that must be navigated somehow. As Hayden White pointed out in a later essay:
[E]vents are real not because they occurred but because, first, they were remembered and, second, they are capable of finding a place in a chronologically ordered sequence. In order, however, for an account of them to be considered a historical account, it is not enough that they be recorded in the order of their original occurrence. It is the fact that they can be recorded otherwise, in an order of narrative, that makes them, at one and the same time, questionable as to their authenticity and susceptible to being considered as tokens of reality. [...] The authority of the historical narrative is the authority of reality itself; the historical account endows this reality with form and thereby makes it desirable by the imposition upon its processes of the formal coherency that only stories possess. (White 1987, 20) Through this formal coherency, according to White, history delivers a temporary closure to our world, in which "reality wears the mask of a meaning, the completeness and fullness of which we can only imagine, never experience." (White 1987, 21) Jörg Haustein, University of Heidelberg Theorizing Pentecostal Historiography
Discourse: The Empty Signifier of Persecution
This desire for a closure of the "real" can be connected to Laclau and Mouffe's political theory of discourse, which is motivated by post-structuralist thought. Their understanding of discourse fundamentally rests on the established semiotic insight that "language (and by extension, all signifying systems) is a system of differences, that linguistic identities-values-are purely relational." (Laclau 1994, 168) This relational interdependence of signifiers also means that "the totality of language is involved in each single act of signification," (Laclau 1994, 168) which in turn presupposes its closure, because if "the meaning of a term was purely relational and determined only by its opposition to all the others" then there needs to be a limitation to these relations by way of a closed system in order to fix the meaning of every element.
Laclau and Mouffe insist that not only language but any "discursive totality," like society or history, "never exists in the form of a simply given and delimited positivity," instead "the relational logic will be incomplete and pierced by contingency." (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, 110-1) Closure therefore is impossible in a positive or ontological sense, but it is also necessary, because without a "fictitious fixing of meaning there would be no meaning at all." (Laclau 1996, 205) However, the limits of this system cannot be represented directly, because if a discourse is a system of differences, the outside of the system cannot be related to its interior in a mere relation of opposition or contradiction, since these are differential relations themselves and would again collapse the system into an extended flow of differences. Therefore, the outside of a discourse can only be conceptualized as "radical negativity," as the antagonistic subversion of the conceptual system as such. This subversive negativity beyond the system limits, in turn, is represented within the discourse by collapsing the differences within the system into a chain of equivalences: a discourse suggests a fundamental sameness with respect to the outside antagonist. This chain of equivalences, which Laclau calls an "empty signifier," is established in a hegemonic operation, temporarily halting the flow of differences and thereby establishing a discursive identity. The popular articulation of this discursive identity is what constitutes a group, or "the people" in The establishment of a persecution discourse therefore is an example of narrative closure, whichlike any historical production -relies on the editing of sources, the characterization of protagonists, and the omission of elements not fitting the narrative. This is not to deny the reality of Ethiopian
Pentecostal sufferings or to imply historical fraud, but to point out that the telling of history is always a hegemonic and thereby political operation.
Genealogy: The History of the Persecution Discourse
The resulting configuration of historical knowledge has a history in and of itself which also needs to be subjected to historical analysis. This is of course an established point in historical research.
Historians explore the genesis of present historical knowledge by following references and searching for veiled or forgotten material, ideally arriving at a plethora of sources and interpretations. However, as Michel de Certeau has pointed out, the practice of writing history then inverts the direction of historical inquiry: the past, which was the vanishing point during research, now becomes the point of origin, whereas the present, from where the researcher departed, becomes the goal of the resulting text. (See Certeau 1988, 86-99) In other words: historical writings propose an origin in the past (i.e. the inviolable identity of events), and aim to speak into the present by way of instruction. According to de Certeau the historical text therefore is a mirror writing obfuscating the historical practice, which, by contrast, originated in the present and spoke its findings into the past.
Against such invented origins and the implicit finality of historical writings, Michel Foucault has proposed the genealogy as an " 'effective' history", which "opposes itself to the search for 'origins'" and rejects "the meta-historical deployment of ideal significations and indefinite teleologies." (Foucault 1977, 140 ) Using Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morality as a point of departure Foucault sought to "dispel the chimeras of origin" (Foucault 1977, 143) by two related, but entirely different concepts, Herkunft and Entstehung, descent and emergence. Herkunft or descent means [...] to maintain passing events in their proper dispersion; it is to identify the accidents, the minute deviations-or conversely, the complete reversals-the errors, the false Jörg Haustein, University of Heidelberg Theorizing Pentecostal Historiography appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us. (Foucault 1977, 152) Entstehung or emergence, on the other hand, should not be viewed as "the final term of a historical development," but the genealogy must seek "to reestablish the various systems of subjection: not the anticipatory power of meaning, but the hazardous play of dominations." (Foucault 1977, 148) Thus, descent recovers historical disparity instead of the singularity of origin, and emergence disperses the notion of finality by historicising historical knowledge in the struggle of concrete forces.
In the case of our example, Engelsviken's persecution account now is the established version of history about the events of 1972. However, the archived writings of the Swedish missionary Tage
Johansson may help to recover the contemporaneous disparity of opinions and interpretations, since he was a vociferous critic of the political strategy the Ethiopian Pentecostals adopted and therefore 
Context: A Circular Conclusion
The analysis of Pentecostal historiography and its history therefore is an important and often neglected path to understanding Pentecostal identity and history. As was argued with Hayden White, historiography is not an unavoidable by-product of writing about the past, but a necessary feature in making history real. The selection of events reported, the narrative structure adopted, the arguments implied or made explicit -they all give a certain "closure" to the past, and they make possible the articulation of history as well as of historical meaning. As the discourse theory of
Laclau and Mouffe has shown, such closures are necessary but inherently arbitrary, and therefore they are subject to political dynamics, as different groups, sources, and authors argue for the "correct" representation and interpretation of past events. For the historian, such debates are an important field of study, and Foucault's concept of genealogy can provide a sense of direction in how to navigate this field: On the one hand historical writings should seek to restore the multifarious complexity of the past, the colourful mesh of articulations and actions which cannot be reduced to simple cause-effect relations or one story only. On the other hand they should show how certain interpretations -and thereby reductions -of the historical plurality have become possible and attained a certain hegemony in the historical archive. In this way, history remains an important ally in the critique of ideology.
This historical approach can also provide new ways of dealing with the initially mentioned problems in the writing of Pentecostal history. First, the multiplicity and divergence of sources is a resource rather than a nuisance, because it is no longer necessary to argue for one story of what "actually" happened, but to restore the past plethora of voices and opinions, which would need not "read between the lines" of the dominant historical tale in order to criticize the same; a literary critique of narratives often enough has the same effect. Moreover, carving out the blind spot of histories and leaving it empty may be a better way to represent the agency of the subaltern rather than to attempt to reconstruct their motives and actions from sources that were not interested in them. Similarly, a critical reading of the dominant persecution narrative may uncover how it tends to eclipse the political dimension of the persecuted community, including its own dissent. The goal, however, is not to draw up an alternative tale of how the Ethiopian church should have behaved in its oppressive environment, but to restore the contemporaneous complexity and difficulty of the political decisions that Pentecostals were required to make.
With regard to the second issue in Pentecostal historiography, the representation of providence, the approach sketched above underscores the historiographical relevance of providential narratives to history without needing to speculate about their philosophical or empirical possibility. Instead, the analysis of persecution accounts may delineate the theological and historical circumstances of providential narratives as well as the political power they entail. In a time of political turmoil, only months before the EFGBC was closed, the church articulated its defiance of worldly powers through its providential history of persecution: whatever oppression rulers may bring and however difficult it may be to understand "God's ways," he will use everything to build his kingdom. It is also clear why the providential was less featured in the other accounts: the Lutheran missionary Tormod Engelsviken was interested in a systemic critique of the Ethiopian empire and the Pentecostal missionary Tage Johansson in resolving the situation. Therefore they needed to base their narratives on the rationality (or irrationality in Engelsviken's case) of the political process, and a providential reading would not have helped them to make their argument. Therefore, as Kay has rightly demanded, it is important to include the Pentecostal assertions of providence in the writing of Pentecostal history, but not in order to copy their narrative thrust or to accommodate the feelings of Pentecostal informants, but in order to recover and retain a fuller dimension of the Ethiopian Pentecostal self-understanding, which still governs much of their outlook on politics. Providential history is not just a belief about the origin of historical events, but more importantly a theological compass for navigating the present.
However, what is the epistemological status of such a history based on the analysis of historiography? Is it a meta-history, hovering above the fray about historical truth, liberated from the burden of telling history itself? Quite to the contrary, I would argue that the epistemological position of this kind of history is no different from the others. It is a part of that which it seeks to describe, subject to the same dynamics of narrativity, discursive hegemony and historical contingency. Just like any other, this history also aspires to being referenced in turn, at best altering facets of the historical debate. More importantly though, the analysis of historiography is deeply indebted to its sources, citing and discussing the narratives they offer, the positions they take, and the terms they employ. It is for this reason that Jacques Derrida cautioned against a discourse that presumes to be in an exterior position to that which it describes. In Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences he contended that all "destructive discourses [...] are trapped in a sort of circle:"
This circle is unique. It describes the form of the relationship between the history of metaphysics and the destruction of the history of metaphysics. There is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order to attack metaphysics. We have no language-no syntax and no lexicon-which is alien to this history; we cannot utter a single destructive proposition which has not already slipped into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to contest. (Derrida 1978, 280) In other words: a critical analysis of Pentecostal historiography will easily be subject to the same dynamics it seeks to explain. The deconstruction of the politics of persecution was made possible by introducing a political dimension to historiography. The analysis of the plots, arguments and ideological implications of historical narratives quietly inserted a narrative plot of authorial intent, an argument about the historical context of sources, and the implication that there is no "objective" history. Contesting the notion that the Security Department's letter was based on nothing but malicious rumours has meant to implicate a certain malice on behalf of the translator, who left out the decisive phrases explaining the government's legal rationale. And so on.
However, this referentiality of histories and their sources goes beyond semiotic and structural parallels; it is connected to the production of text itself, as Derrida has also shown. In Signature Event Context he argued that all writing supposes a dual absence: that of the addressee and that of the author, since writing must remain legible when the author or any potential addressee are absent.
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[t]o write is to produce a mark that will constitute a kind of machine that is in turn productive, that my future disappearance in principle will not prevent from functioning and from yielding, and yielding itself to, reading and rewriting. (Derrida 1982a, 316) Two consequences follow: first, any writing, any sign must be iterable, capable to be copied, repeated and cited; and secondly by this iterability, all signs "can break with every given context, and engender infinitely new contexts in an absolutely nonsaturable fashion." (Derrida 1982a, 320) The point of this inherent link between repetition and alterity is that a text is not understood by reference to an ordinary context, but because it is a citation of another text, which in turn cites another one, and so on. Histories therefore are recognizable not because of a direct relationship between a text and past physical events, but because they are citations of other accounts. As histories continuously cite previous texts and contexts, thereby also breaking with them and engendering new ones, historical meaning is continuously deferred, altered, permuted, and ultimately postponed. This is the dynamic of the différance as described by Derrida. (1982b, esp. 7-12, 20) Just as the incessant differing of signifiers defers signification, the telling of histories continuously postpones historical meaning. Definitive history is no more possible than the deferred presence of the sign.
Therefore, while the analysis of persecution narratives offered above aims to offer fresh insights into the political dynamics of Ethiopian Pentecostal history and historiography, it is essentially no different from the sources it cites -that is to say, it is not the only valid account dictated by actual events, but hopefully a plausible read of its sources.
